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1. Introduction
1.1. Leadership Choices in Global Perspective
What makes a leader worthy of support? Across a vari-
ety of different contexts, people evaluate leaders based
on a range of factors; from their leadership style, to the
position they inherited or obtained through talent and
ability achieved (Corbett, 2019), to certain characteris-
tics they display, such as competence, strength or charis-
ma (Aaldering&Vliegenthart, 2016).Why people choose
leaders matters because it sets criteria against which cit-
izens judge them as successful or not. It can influence
whether people confer or withdraw support and, in turn,
how far those leaders are responsive to people’s inter-
ests. From a development perspective, understanding
how people evaluate leaders is therefore key to under-
standing when and how change happens.
Leadership is not an individual ‘heroic’ act (Andrews,
2016). Rather, it is “a process of social influence in which
one person is able to enlist the aid and support of oth-
ers in the accomplishment of a common task” (Chemers,
2002, p. 1). All leaders need followers and leadership
works through a political process of interaction between
followers’ evaluations and leaders’ actions (Hudson &
Mcloughlin, 2019). In practice, we often see puzzling rela-
tionships between what might be perceived to be in fol-
lowers’ interests, and how leaders act: Charismatic lead-
ers can be extremely popular, but ultimately ineffective
at driving change, while transformational leadersmay be
extremely effective at improving lives, but highly unpopu-
lar. By uncoveringwhat’s going on beneath the surface of
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the leader-follower relationship, we can therefore start
to unpickwhen and how itmight be enabling or disabling
progressive, developmental reform. For example, if we
want to understand why leaders sometimes retain their
legitimacy when they fail to deliver on their promises, or
when leaders who do delivermay fail to hold onto power,
we can examine how followers are evaluating them.
In this article we test how people evaluate leaders,
with an emphasis on the power of identity in shaping
this evaluation. The social identity theory of leadership
predicts that people are more likely to support lead-
er ‘prototypes’—leaders who reflect and represent the
identity of the group that they themselves most close-
ly identify with (Hogg & Knippenberg, 2003). In turn,
being a prototypical leader can have important effects
on how people evaluate these leaders, as compared to
non-prototypical leaders who may be seen as relative
outsiders. Using a survey experiment in Indonesia we
test the core propositions of this theory. Our contribu-
tion to this nascent literature is novel in two ways. First,
much of the existing literature has been confined to
the social psychology, management or organisational sci-
ences. We expand this to test whether and how this
theory holds in the public, political domain. Second, we
extend this literature from its focus on developed coun-
tries in the West, to an Asian setting.
We argue—and our findings confirm—that identity
(and prototypicality in particular) is a key (possibly the
key) way that citizens perceive, assess and therefore sup-
port or not their leaders. The implications of this are
many, profound, and questionably progressive—though
potentially so. We find that identity typically trumps per-
formance when it comes to citizen assessments of trust,
capability and protection. The results of our survey in
Indonesia add much detail to the more general thesis.
Plus, we argue, that the specifics of the Indonesian case
underline the point that the particular dimensions of
identity that matter in each context is precisely that:
context specific. Identity matters, but which dimensions
matter vary. In the Indonesian context we find that reli-
gious identity trumps ethnicity. We also use a variety
of different survey questions and techniques to show
that while many people say that gender is not a key
category, respondents’ revealed preferences show that
it typically is. We also confirm that prototypicality pri-
marily works through people’s assessment of trustwor-
thiness. Finally, and importantly, the effects of prototyp-
icality are not uniform—in our data women are less eas-
ily persuaded by prototypicality and the provincial con-
text matters.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we set out the
core propositions of the social identity theory of leader-
ship, reviewing findings from past research. Second, we
set the scene for our study by describing why these ques-
tions are pertinent in the case of Indonesia, and outline
themethodologyweused to explore them in this context.
Third, we present the findings for each of our research
questions in turn. Finally, we conclude with implications
for Indonesia and, more widely, for understanding the
role of identity in leadership for development.
1.2. The Social Identity Theory of Leadership
A popular theory from the leadership and social psychol-
ogy literature says that other things held constant, peo-
ple evaluate leaders based on their identity. This social
identity theory of leadership predicts that people will
look for leaders who reflect the identity and characteris-
tics of the group they feel most closely associated with
(Hogg & Knippenberg, 2003). The underlying premise
is that individuals perceive leaders through the lens of
their social group because groups “define who we are,
and influence what we think, feel, and do, and how oth-
ers perceive and treat us” (Hogg, van Knippenberg, &
Rast, 2012). Indeed, people look to leaders to define
their group identity, and whether this is more or less
shaped by attributes such as ethnicity, religion, gender,
or by certain values or traditions. Leaderswho reflect and
embody this identity can be thought of as ‘prototypical’
leaders. Such a leader would be likely be considered a
typical group member—‘one of us’—and as such, some-
one who best understands and is willing to defend the
interests of the group.
Looking or behaving like a prototypical leader mat-
ters because it can have real effects on how followers
evaluate them. In the literature, there are two particular-
ly striking propositions about the effects of prototypical-
ity on follower perceptions. First, people are more likely
to endorse, trust and support prototypical leaders. In oth-
er words, they are more likely to judge ‘ingroup’ mem-
bers more favourably than ‘outgroup’ members with the
same characteristics (Marques & Paez, 1994). Empirical
tests carried out across a broad suite of contexts seem to
confirm a strong preference towards prototypical group
leaders (Reicher, Haslam,& Platow, 2018). These and oth-
er studies explain this preference because people tend
to think that prototypical members are more likely to be
invested in the group, inherently trustworthy, and better
able to promote group interests.
Second, because of their identity, prototypical lead-
ers can behave differently to non-prototypical lead-
ers without the same consequences as non-prototypes.
Some studies have found that because prototypicalmem-
bers are perceived to be more legitimate and trust-
worthy, they may not always need to act in followers’
interests, be effective, or act fairly, to retain support.
Sometimes they can retain this trust even when they are
ineffective at delivering benefits for the group. In other
words, while non-prototypical leaders may have to per-
form well to gain trust, prototypical leaders can some-
times are granted a ‘license to fail’ simply because of
their identity (Giessner, van Knippenberg, & Sleebos,
2009; Hogg & Knippenberg, 2003). Some lab experi-
ments even suggest that identity can override percep-
tions of fairness; people may support prototypical lead-
ers whether they are considered fair or not (Ullrich &
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Christ, 2009). Because people trust prototypical leaders,
it may also be the case that such leaders have more lat-
itude to diverge from group norms, or seek to change
them (Abrams, de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008).
In other words, prototypical leaders may also have more
leeway to be transformational—to push the boundaries
of norms, and even go against the interests of the group,
while retaining their legitimacy. So, while the idea of
identity trumping merit may be a cause of concern, it
is also worth flagging that, conditional on prototypical
leaders’ motivations, values, and priorities, this could
be good news for progressive, developmental change.
Developmental leadership will often involve bending or
breaking social norms and existing institutions to bring
about change (Hudson,Mcloughlin,Marquette, & Roche,
2018). Prototypicality may help do this—for good or
for ill.
A small but significant body of empirical work has
investigated the conditions under which these prototyp-
icality effects hold, and how strongly. One key question,
recently addressed by Baretto and Hogg (2017), is how
much variance in leadership evaluation can be attribut-
ed to protoypicality, versus other important dimen-
sions of assessment, such as leadership style or per-
sonality. Overall, they found a strong effect of proto-
typicality on trust, and a moderate effect on evalua-
tions of effectiveness. Likewise, elsewhere, several fac-
tors have been found to moderate the prototypicality
effect. These include how strongly members associate
with their group (Giessner et al., 2009), and the leader’s
gender (Hogg et al., 2006). The prototypicality effect has
been found to weaken when individuals face uncertain-
ty about their own self-identity (Rast, Gaffney, Hogg, &
Crisp, 2012).
While this new theory and emerging bodyof research
is producing robust and increasingly nuanced findings, it
has also been limited in scope. The majority of analy-
sis to date has been located in the organisational and
management sciences, or social psychology. All of the 35
selected studies that Baretto and Hogg (2017) examined
in their metanalysis addressed prototypicality in organi-
sational settings, or via lab experiments. This study seeks
to address some of these gaps and extend the utility of
the social identity theory in other spheres of public life.
It offers a novel test of the social identity theory, by exam-
ining the relationship between prototypicality and sup-
port for political leadership in Indonesia.
2. Examining Prototypical Leadership in Indonesia
2.1. The Indonesian Case
The research set out to test some of the key proposi-
tions that arise from the social identity theory of lead-
ership in the Indonesian context. Following the standard
in this field (van Knippenberg, 2011), our approach first
identifies what prototypical leadership looks like across
our research site, and then examines the effects that
being a prototype, or non-prototype, has on leader eval-
uations. Several aspects of our approach are relatively
novel within this nascent literature. First, our approach
is based on respondents’ preferences for the social iden-
tity characteristics of leaders, rather than on any precon-
ceived assumptions or hypothetical constructs. In this
way, we can develop a perceptions-based, empirical pic-
ture of what a prototypical leader actually looks like
and crucially, demonstrate how those prototypes vary
across individuals with different identity characteristics,
as well as across spaces. Second, while the majority
of previous studies have measured the effects of lead-
er prototypicality on leadership evaluations in terms of
either trustworthiness or effectiveness, we compare the
effects of prototypicality versus non-prototypicality on
both of these dimensions of assessment. Finally, we
experiment with the effect of ‘failure’ on evaluations of
prototypical versus non prototypical leaders, again show-
ing how this effect varies across the demographics of
the respondents.
Indonesia is a pertinent case for two reasons. First, it
was an authoritarian regime for over 30 years, only expe-
riencing direct elections of their leaders since mid-2000.
Indonesia’s “transition to electoral democracy” (Bunte &
Ufen, 2009, p. 12 can be traced to 1999, when the coun-
try had its first democratic election following the resigna-
tion of Suharto from his three-decades Presidency that
also marked the end of the New Order Regime. During
that period, Indonesians had regular five-year general
elections, but saw no transfer of power, while all local
leaders were appointed by the national government.
Against such centralized power structures and strongmil-
itary role, support for the political leadership was tak-
en for granted. The first direct elections happened in
2004 for the President and in 2005 for local government
leaders. As such, Indonesians have recently learned first-
hand the importance of having the knowledge to assess
the effectiveness and trustworthiness of a leader that
they could now directly choose. Second, direct local elec-
tions in Indonesia have seen rampant money politics
(Aspinall & Mas’udi, 2017) and “identity-based mobiliza-
tions” (Davidson, 2018) impeding vertical accountability
between constituents and their leaders.
The link between identity and leadership is particu-
larly salient for Indonesia. As the world’s largest Muslim-
majority country, with a heterogeneous ethnic and socio-
cultural background, identity politics can be readilymobi-
lized for support or resistance in elections. A number
of scholars have highlighted how the rise of religious
intolerance and identity politics, coupled with hardlin-
er populists, may pose a potential stumbling block to
the growth of democracy in Indonesia (Bourchier, 2019;
Fealy, 2013; Hefner, 2019; Menchik, 2019; Mietzner,
2014; Power, 2018). In the context of a country flagged
as potentially facing democratic stagnation (Mietzner,
2020), understanding people’s perception of trustworthy
and effective leadership may provide important insights
into how to move forward.
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2.2. Data and Method
To study people’s perceptions of what makes a lead-
er effective and trustworthy in Indonesia, we focused
on the lowest elected level of political leadership.
In Indonesia, this is the heads of districts, the Bupatis
or Walikota. We surveyed 5 provinces: Jakarta, North
Sumatra,West Java, East Java, and South Sulawesi. These
were chosen because they are among the most dense-
ly populated areas, and also because each has particular
political dynamicswhich allowus to testwhether the the-
ory holds across different contexts. In all five provinces,
there are various ethnic groups with diverse dialects and
local languages. In North Sumatra, the practice of clien-
telism in politics is strong, as reported by survey and
election reports (Bawaslu, 2019). North Sumatra is also
known to be home to a significant portion of Indonesia’s
Christian population. As the capital city, Jakarta is an
important political, cultural and economic hub. It also
represents a ‘melting pot’ of various ethnic groups
migrating to make a living in the city. West Java is a busi-
ness and political centre, and also the native homeland
of Sundanese people, who form the largest ethnic group.
This province is known to be politically conservative,with
a predominant religious (Islam) influence. East Java is the
second most populated province after West Java. While
ethnic Javanese make up the majority of the population,
the province also has a significant portion of minority
groups. This province is the homeofNadhatul Ulama, the
biggest Muslim mass-organization in Indonesia. South
Sulawesi is widely known as having a political system pre-
dominantly influenced by dynasty politics, strong tradi-
tional communities as well as religion.
Purposive non-probability sampling was used to
select the provinces, as per above, but once we had iden-
tified our survey locations we used a stratified sampling
frame that targeted a representative sample by gender
and age within the five provinces of interest. Weights
were used to correct any remaining differences between
the sample and provincial population, the distribution
across the provinces is shown in Table 1. The respon-
dents were taken from an online panel. The final sample
was 2,003 respondents. The fieldwork was conducted by
Deltapoll in partnership with Viga.
We collected a range of demographic data on survey
respondents, including their age, gender, province, pro-
fession, level of education, religion, ethnicity, personal
monthly income. We also collected a range of attitudinal
data, including their self-reported personality, religiosity
or strength of faith, position with respect to traditions.
The survey contained three parts, and the methodol-
ogy was tailored to address three research questions, set
out below. The first is the following:
RQ1: What does a prototypical leader look like, and
does this vary by individuals, groups and across dif-
ferent parts of Indonesia?
In order to understand what a prototypical leader looks
like in Indonesia, respondents were asked a number of
questions about their group identity and the charac-
teristics they think leaders should have. Respondents
were first asked to indicate the three most impor-
tant characteristics that matter to their group identity.
The options were: age, gender, ethnicity, religion, edu-
cation, province and nationality.
Respondents were then asked to construct two dif-
ferent leader profiles. Based on social identity theory,
we identified seven key characteristics for them to select
from: gender, age, faith, ethnicity, leadership style, reli-
giosity, and attitude towards existing traditions. Each of
these characteristics could be selected on a number of
levels, which are shown in Table 2. Respondents were
told that the first leader profile should represent the kind
of leader that they personally would prefer to see in pow-
er. The second leader profile should look like the kind of
leader they believe is most likely to represent the wider
interests of the group that they identify with. They were
told that the two profiles may look the same or be differ-
ent from one another.
The second research question is the following:
RQ2: What effect does prototypicality have on per-
ceptions of trustworthiness, effectiveness, and repre-
sentation of interests?
To test the difference a prototypical leadermakes on peo-
ple’s perceptions of trustworthiness, effectiveness, and
representation of their interest, our 2,003 respondents
were then randomly assigned to two groups. The first
group were shown a leader profile that matched their
prototypical leader (Group P)—i.e., the kind of leader
they had identified as most likely to represent the wider
interests of the group that they identify with. The sec-
Table 1. Survey sample by province.
Jakarta Special
East Java Capital Region North Sumatra South Sulawesi West Java
Respondents 483 624 246 128 522
Age mean 33.4 32.2 31.2 31.8 31.5
Age standard deviation 15.0 13.9 16.3 16.4 13.0
Gender Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Percentage 49.4% 50.6% 49.1% 50.9% 49.6% 50.4% 50.3% 49.7% 48.9% 51.1%
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Table 2. Leaders profile characteristics and levels.
Levels
Gender Female Male
Age 27 years old 37 years old 47 years old 57 years old 67 years old
Religious faith Muslim Protestant Christian Catholic Christian Hindu Buddhist Confucian
Ethnicity Jawa Sunda Batak Madura Betawi
Bugis Tionghoa Bali Makassar An ethnic group of
East Nusa Tenggara
Religiosity They do not regularly They observe major They regularly attend They have a very strong
attend a place festivals, but do not their place of worship faith and make religion
of worship regularly attend a place central to their life
of worship and work
Tradition They want to restore They want to protect They tend to overlook They want to abolish
traditions and return existing traditions to keep existing traditions and existing traditions and
things to how they were things how they are go their own way replace them with
a new vision
ond group was shown a randomly created leader pro-
file that was non-prototypical (Group NP). Both groups
received a manifesto statement from either their pro-
totypical leader or a non-prototypical leader. The man-
ifesto statement was identical for the two groups, the
only difference being the leader profile (see Figure 1 for
an example).
Respondents were then asked to indicate the extent
towhich they: (1) could trust this leader, (2) thought they
would be a capable leader, and (3) felt the leader would
represent their interests. All responses were on a scale
of 0 to 9, where 0 indicates strongly disagree and 9 indi-
cates strongly agree.
The third research question is the following:
RQ3: Are prototypical leaders more likely than non-
prototypical leaders to be supported, evenwhen they
are ineffective?
Next, we wanted to find out whether people judge the
performance of prototypical and non-prototypical lead-
ers differently. The literature suggests that prototypical
leaders can retain trust and legitimacy even if they fail
or go against followers’ interests, while non-prototypical
leaders struggle to build trust or legitimacy even when
they deliver developmental goods.
To test this, we added a second randomisation
where the respondents kept their prototypical or non-
prototypical leader profile but were given further infor-
mation aboutwhether the leaderwas successful or failed
to achieve theirmanifesto goals (see Table 3 for the state-
ments). Of the group that kept their prototypical lead-
er profile, half of them were told that five years later
the leader had been successful. The other half were told
that their prototypical leader had failed. The same treat-
ment was given to the groupwho had a non-prototypical
“I am proud to be selected as your representative. My number one priority in office is to reform
our community’s schools and health clinics to make sure that they go to the people most in need
and are the people who will benefit the most. Reform will not be easy and it will involve many






They are able to get things done
They regularly attend
their place of worship
They seek to protect existing traditions
to keep things how they are
Figure 1. Example leader profile and manifesto.
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Table 3. Success and failure treatments.
Success treatment 5 years later, at the end of their term of office, this leader had successfully delivered on their
promise to reform the schools and health clinics in the Kabupaten. The reforms were hard won,
but resulted in improved literacy levels and access to essential medicines.
Failure treatment 5 years later, at the end of their term of office, this leader had failed to deliver on their promise
to reform the schools and health clinics in the Kabupaten. The reforms were unsuccessful: the
investment and hard work was wasted and there was no improvement in literacy levels or access
to essential medicines.
leader profile. Half of them were told that five years lat-
er the non-prototypical leader had been successful, and
the other half were told that the non-prototypical leader
had failed. In effect, the randomisation meant that the
sample was evenly split across four treatment groups, as
per the 2 × 2 shown in Table 4.
3. Findings and Discussion
3.1. Results
3.1.1. Research Question 1
Our first question went as follows:
Many people belong to a larger group of people
because of a shared culture, history, background,
interests or identity. Thinking about the group(s) of
people you identify most strongly with, please indi-
cate the first, second and third most important char-
acteristics that matter to your group identity.
As shown in Figure 2, the most common response was
nationality, where 67% of respondents selected ‘being a
fellow Indonesian’ as their first, second, or third ranked
most important characteristic. This is followed by hav-
ing a shared religion (61% of respondents ranked this
option), education (47%), age (45%—though note 19.5%
ranked it first), ethnicity (27%), region (27%), and finally
gender (26%).
We also then modelled respondents’ choices to see
whether different sub-groups of our sample tended to
favour different characteristics. We collapsed the three
ranked choices into a single outcome variable of ‘cho-
sen’ (1) or ‘not chosen’ (0) and ran a series of binary
logistic regressions on each group identity characteristic.
We then calculated the average marginal effects, mean-
ing we can report here the average change in probability
of a characteristic being chosen by different respondent
characteristics compared to a baseline category, averag-
ing over all other observations in the sample. We looked
to see whether the respondent’s gender, age, education,
ethnicity, province, religion and religiosity predicted the
likelihood of selecting the seven group identity character-
istics shown in Figure 2. We do not report the full results
here, but identify the key substantively and statistically
significant predictors.
Being from the same religion was the second most
frequently mentioned category for respondents. Those
who identify as being ethnically Betawi or Minangkabau
were more likely to select religion, as are respondents
from West Java. But identifying as Muslim or Hindu
are the most important predictors of selecting religion
(increasing the probability of selecting by 47% and
39%, respectively). Respondents’ religiosity matters too.
Those who regularly attend their place of worship were
16% more likely to select and those who make their
faith central to their life were 18% more, compared with
thosewho only attend formajor festivals. Taken together
these results suggest a stronger prioritisation of religion
as a key identity category for these two faiths (compared
with Christians, Buddhists, and those of other faiths)
and all individuals with stronger religiosity (regardless
of faith).
Finally, being the same gender mattered more for
male respondents; they were 14% more likely than
female respondents to say that being from the same gen-
der matters to their group identity. This tells us that men
identify with fellow men more than fellow women iden-
tify with fellow women, as a category of group identity.
In order to understand the importance of identity fur-
ther, we then asked our respondents to ‘build’ their own
personal ideal leaders and what they believed would be
a prototypical leader for their identity group. This time
Table 4. The four treatment groups based on prototypicality and non-prototypicality and policy success and failure.
Prototypical Non-prototypical
leader profile leader profile
Success treatment Group PS Group NPS
(25.3% of sample) (24.0% of sample)
Failure treatment Group PF Group NPF
(24.1% of sample) (26.6% of sample)




















Figure 2.Most important characteristics for group identity. Notes: Sample: Deltapoll | Indonesia | 24–28 December 2018
| n = 2,003 | Question: Many people belong to a larger group of people because of a shared culture, history, background,
interests or identity. Thinking about the group(s) of people you identify most strongly with, please indicate the first, second
and third most important characteristics that matter to your group identity.
we asked respondents to consider the following dimen-
sions of identity: gender, age, religion, ethnicity, religios-
ity, but also their personality type and attitude towards
traditions. The options offered to respondents are shown
in Table 2.
While there is no single prototypical leader among
respondents, several patterns emerged in respect to our
key criteria:
As for gender: A whopping 86% chose a male leader
and only 14% chose a female leader. While women were
more likely to choose a female leader than male respon-
dents, they still only chose a female leader 18% of the
time compared to only 10% of men. Respondents from
North Sumatra are most likely to prefer women leaders
(23%) and those fromWest Java were the least (9%).
As for age: Given the choice of a 27, 37, 47, 57,
or 67-year old leader, 46% of respondents preferred a
47-year old.
As for religious faith: 79% of respondents preferred
a Muslim leader. As expected, this was mostly driven
by respondents selecting their own faith, with 94% of
Muslims selecting a Muslim leader, 63% of Protestant
Christians selecting a Protestant Christian leader and
62% of Catholic Christians selecting a Catholic Christian
leader. Notably, while respondents of more minority reli-
gions did still favour their own, they were more like-
ly to nominate a Muslim leader. For example, although
47% of Hindus favoured a Hindhu leader, 40% chose a
Muslim leader.
As for ethnicity: 60% of respondents choose a leader
with the same ethnicity as them. Men were more likely
to do so (64%) than women (57%). East Javanese (74%)
respondentsweremost likely to choose a leaderwith the
same ethnicity as them and South Sulawesi respondents
were the least likely to do so (40% of the time).
As for religiosity: In terms of the importance of a lead-
er’s faith, 52% wanted a leader who had a very strong
faith and made religion central to their life and work and
another 37% wanted a leader who regularly attended
their place of worship. There were no significant differ-
ences between men and women. West Java (58%) were
more likely to choose a leader who have a very strong
faith and make religion central to their life, and respon-
dents from South Sulawesi were least likely (39%).
As for tradition: A majority (59%) chose a leader who
would protect existing traditions to keep things how they
are. There were no significant differences between men
and women respondents, or across the provinces.
As for personality: When given the choice between
a leader who was either (1) honest and fair; (2) humble
and forgiving; (3) able to inspire people to follow them;
(4) confident and outspoken; or (5) able to get things
done, 66% of respondents want a leader to be honest
and fair. There were no significant differences between
men and women. Jakarta Special Capital Region (19%)
were more likely to choose a leader who could get things
done than respondents from North Sumatra (9%).
In sum, we note three clear trends from the data.
First, respondents tend to ‘design’ leaders that embody
their own personal characteristics and those of their
group. Second, this effect is strongest in terms of reli-
gious faith, but weakest in terms of gender—where large
majorities among both women and men prefer male
leaders. Here, shared perceptions of prototypicality at
the group level clearly outweigh any sense of shared
female identity. This also confirms the last placed posi-
tion of gender in Figure 2. Third, and finally, where
respondents are in a minority group, they are less likely
to select their own ‘type’ and defer tomajority character-
istics. This was illustrated by 4 in 10 Hindu respondents
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nominating a Muslim leader as best placed to represent
the wider interests of the group that they identify with.
Together, these results, descriptively, confirm the pres-
ence of prototypicality in leader selection in Indonesia.
Butwhat effect does prototypicality have on citizens’ per-
ceptions of leaders and their support. This is what we
turn to next.
3.2. Research Question 2
Having been allocated to read the manifesto statement
from either a prototypical or non-prototypical leader,
as explained above, we measured people’s trust, per-
ception of effectiveness, and belief that the leader
would protect the interests of the respondent’s group.
Figure 3 shows the difference in responses between the
two groups.
The results demonstrate a clear effect of prototyp-
icality. Prototypical leaders are more trusted, scoring
an average rating of 7.6 as opposed to 5.5 (a 39%
increase). Prototypical leaders are consideredmore capa-
ble or effective, scoring an average rating of 7.6 ver-
sus 5.6 for the non-prototypical leader (a 35% increase).
And prototypical leaders are felt more likely to protect
the interests of the group, scoring an average rating
of 7.5 versus 5.3 for the non-prototypical leader (38%
increase). Taken together, this suggests that, along these
key indicators of support, prototypical leaders are get-
ting a boost of roughly a third over and above their
non-prototypical rivals.
The marginally stronger effect for trust (and inter-
ests) is supported by previous studies that suggest pro-
totypicality is more closely linked to trust than effective-
ness (Van Lange, 2015). They confirm the in-built rela-
tionship between prototypicality and trust that lies at the
core of social identity theory; these leaders are trusted
because their identity is more closely tied to the identi-
ty of the group, and trusting them is akin to trusting the
group identity (Van Lange, 2015).
3.2.1. Research Question 3
Finally, we wanted to see whether prototypicality effects
would still hold when respondents were updated on the
actual performance of leaders. Specifically, would suc-
cess or failure outweigh identity? Figure 4 shows the
difference in responses on our three indicators of inter-
est across the four groups, as described in the data and
methods section: prototypical successful leaders, proto-
typical failed leaders, non-prototypical successful lead-
ers, non-prototypical failed leaders.
A consistent story and hierarchy emerge. First, suc-
cessful leaders are consistently perceived as more trust-
ed, capable, and likely to represent people’s interests
than unsuccessful leaders. Second, prototypical lead-
ers are consistently perceived as more trusted, capa-
ble, and likely to represent people’s interests than non-
prototypical leaders. But third, even when successful
non-prototypical leaders are still perceived as less trust-
ed and likely to represent people’s interests than unsuc-
cessful prototypical leaders. Only perceptions of capa-
bility are statistically indistinguishable between success-
ful non-prototypical leaders and failed prototypical lead-
ers. In sum, identity overrides reported success or fail-
ure in the evaluation of leadership: Failure is punished
more harshlywhen leaders are non-prototypical. Success
cannot, in other words, consistently match the effects
of prototypicality on positive evaluations of leadership.
In short, there is an in-built protection for prototyp-
ical leaders. Their identity provides a buffer against
failure. On the other hand, non-prototypical leaders
seem to face a glass ceiling in terms of how far their
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Figure 3. The effects of prototypicality on trust, capability, and interests. Notes: Sample: Deltapoll | Indonesia | 24–28
December 2018 | Sample size n = 2,097 | Data weighted to be representative at the Province | Question: I could absolute-
ly trust this person as a Bupati/Walikota | This person would be a very capable leader as a Bupati/Walikota | This leader
would represent my group’s interests as a Bupati/Walikota.
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Figure 4. The effects of leader success and failure. Notes: Sample: Deltapoll | Indonesia | 24–28 December 2018 | Sample
size n = 2,003 | Data weighted to be representative at the Province | Question: I could absolutely trust this person as
a Bupati/Walikota | This person would be a very capable leader as a Bupati/Walikota | This leader would represent my
group’s interests as a Bupati/Walikota.
success can build perceptions of their trustworthiness
and capability.
We looked to see if there are any statistically signifi-
cant and substantively interesting differences in how dif-
ferent groups in our sample responded to the second
experimental treatment. Notably, women responded dif-
ferently to men to the extra information about success
and failure. Female respondents weremore likely to pun-
ish prototypical failure and more likely to react positive-
ly non-prototypical success compared to men—in other
words, womanweighed the importance of the new infor-
mation about success and failure more strongly against
the identity of the leader, meaning the identity effects of
prototypicality were smaller for women. In terms of age,
the 40–59 age group appear unique in upgrading both
non-prototypical success and prototypical success—so
it’s not that they adjusted their viewof the importance of
identity, per se, but that they rewarded successful lead-
ers regardless of it. University degree holders upgrad-
ed prototypical successful leaders too, but were not dif-
ferent to non-degree holders in relation to the other
three treatments. Finally, in terms of religiosity, respon-
dents who make faith central to their lives were unique
in rewarding prototypical success more than those at
other levels of religiosity, and punished successful but
non-prototypical leaders in terms of trust and capability,
but not interest.
4. Discussion
Our findings suggest that identity trumps performance
and that ethnic identity matters less than religious iden-
tity and attitudes around tradition and conservatism in
Indonesia. We use this final section to reflect upon these
findings within the Indonesian context and flag up oth-
er observational studies that support the experimental
findings presented here. We acknowledge there may be
a gap between reported perceptions of leadership in a
survey experiment and actual voting behaviour. By tri-
angulating with previous studies of voting behaviour in
local elections in Indonesia we reflect on robustness of
our results. These studies illustrate the dynamic trends of
Indonesian voters’ support and assessment of the candi-
dates. Plus, we use these discussion to underline the fact
that the dimensions of prototypicality vary over space
and time and are always contingent.
Prasetyawan (2014) examines the two local elec-
tions in Jakarta (2007 and 2012) and emphasises how
the dynamic relations between ethnicity and voting pat-
terns needs to be understood within the relevant polit-
ical context. The relations between ethnicity and vot-
ing changed in magnitude between the two election
cycles, due to a shifting political context and pressing
issues that Jakartans were confronted with, i.e., flood.
Prasetyawan (2014) argues that while ethnicity remains
important notably, in the 2007 election, the capabili-
ties of leaders gained more importance than ethnicity
in the 2012 election. This trend continued into the 2017
Jakarta election as people’s voting behaviour suggested
performance, programmatic politics, ideology and reli-
gion could trump ethnic considerations (Aspinall, 2017).
The significant relations between identity and support
for political leadership in Jakarta local elections appear
to have shifted over the period.
In 2007 Jakarta experienced its first direct local elec-
tion. Here ethnic identity was predominant. Jakarta had
never had a native Betawi Governor. The 2007 election
was won by Fauzi Bowo, a long-term bureaucrat and a
Betawi. His competitor was Adang Dorojatun, a party
elite, a retired police general, of Sunda ethnicity. During
the campaign, both candidates played the ethnic identi-
ty card to secure votes. However, in 2012, this changed
with a non-native Jakartan winning. In the 2012 elec-
tion, JokoWidodo was elected Governor with his Deputy
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Basuki Tjahaya Purnama or more popularly known as
Ahok. Widodo is Javanese and was mayor of Solo. Ahok
is a Christian, Chinese, and was Bupati of East Belitung
in 2005, and then won a seat in the national parlia-
ment from a district in Bangka Belitung Province in 2009.
Together they won 53% votes against the incumbent—
a native Jakartan, alongside his deputy, a fellow native
Jakartan, and retired military general. The outcome of
the 2012 local election in Jakarta illustrates the dynam-
ic and fluid nature of identity for Jakartans at the time
(Hatherell & Welsh, 2017). Therefore, the salience of
identity, and which dimensions, should always be under-
stood in context—and ethnicity is often not always the
main determining factor.
Ahok confirmed his candidacy in 2016 for the follow-
ing year’s election. Despite his reputation for controver-
sial policies and leadership style, support for Ahok had
been consistently strong and commentators believed he
could win in the first round of election (Aspinall, 2017).
However, during the campaign period, Ahokwas charged
with blasphemy and put on trial through to 2017, mean-
ing that the election was between three pairs of candi-
dates, one of whom was in court. Meanwhile, conserva-
tive Muslim groups arranged a series of demonstrations,
massive prayer meetings, and rallies to condemn Ahok
and demand heavy legal sanctions. Yet the results of the
first round of the election saw Ahok winning 43% of the
vote, while his contender Anies Baswedan only got 40%.
If the blasphemy case was beneficial for the other
candidates, it was not enough to outvote Ahok in the
first round. But, the court’s decision of two year’s jail sen-
tence for Ahok has been referred to as a historical turning
point for politics in Indonesia, of rising religious intoler-
ance and the ascendance of hardline conservative Islam
(Bourchier, 2019; Hefner, 2019). Equally, though, others
have argued that the 2017 Jakarta election should not be
understood simply as failed pluralism and religious toler-
ance. Despite the large campaign condemning Ahok as a
menace to Islam and the fact that he lost in the second
round of 2017 election, there is still a significant propor-
tion of Jakartan voters who favor programmatic politics,
amid the rising of organized conservative Islamist groups
that press forward with identity mobilization.
Another study, of the 2010 local election in Medan
city, North Sumatra, conducted by Aspinall, Dettman and
Warburton (2011), suggests that while identity can be
utilized by candidates to mobilize votes, the question of
which identity is more politically salient is contingent on
other factors such as voters’ access to resources. The
multiple candidates in the first round of the election
were from the majority religion, although they came
from various ethnic groups. At this first stage, the cross-
community background of candidates was used to attract
votes. When there were two candidates left in the sec-
ond round, however, the focus was switched to reli-
gious identity which was used to mobilize votes from
various ethnic groups to beat a minority candidate in
order to preserve their access to resources. Again, a
pattern reflected in our survey data. The case shows
how the political salience of identity is constructed, and
can shift through electoral campaigns. Another study by
Fossati, Simandjuntak, and Fionna (2016) offers an analy-
sis on data from surveys conducted in the city of Medan
in North Sumatera, Samarinda in East Kalimantan and
Surabaya in East Java, immediately after the local direct
elections in 2015. Indications from the survey data sug-
gest that ethnic considerations play a marginal role in the
behaviour of voters, even if the report admits that it did
not specifically discuss ethnic politics. Xue (2018) cites a
report of voters’ behaviour conducted by Ananta, Arifin,
& Suryadinata (2004), which shows that ethnicity is a less
important factor in the direct election of local leaders in
South Sulawesi and Bangka Belitung, compared to West
Kalimantanwhere ethnic consideration ismore important
to the voters. Interestingly, South Sulawesi emerges from
our survey data as something of an outlier context too.
We believe that taken together these findings suggest
that despite the significance of ethnicity, other interven-
ing factors such as pressing political issues at the local lev-
el may mediate the effect of ethnic identity mobilization.
5. Conclusion and Implications
This study offers new empirical evidence that supports
the social identity theory of leadership, but in contrast
to the bulk of previous studies, shows this effect in a
non-Western setting, in the political domain. The overall
finding from this research is that identitymatters for peo-
ple’s willingness to support leaders. There is a significant
effect of identity on perceptions of how effective lead-
ers are in Indonesia. These leaders have a built-in reser-
voir of trust based on their identity, that can buffer them
against repercussions from ineffectiveness. This analysis
shows that citizens assess their leaders based on their
identity primarily and their performance secondarily. It
may well be true that persistent poor performance and
neglect will eventually overwhelm prototypicality—but
in recent years we have seen a good many political lead-
ers test this, seemingly to beyond breaking point.
Our results presented here, though, have added
some detail to the more general thesis. First, at least in
the current Indonesian context, religious identity trumps
ethnicity. Secondly, while many citizens will say that
gender is not a key category, our exercise in inviting
respondents to build their own prototypical leader over-
whelmingly revealed that it is typically a male leader
that is preferred. Thirdly, we showed that prototypicali-
ty primarily boosts people’s trust. But fourthly, that the
effects of prototypicality are not evenly manifested—
most importantly women appear to be less encourag-
ing of prototypical failure and less dismissive of non-
prototypical success than men are, and that in certain
contexts (here, South Sulawesi) prototypical leaders are
viewed more skeptically.
It is important to stress, however, that the nuances of
these findings illustrate that the prototypicality effect is
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not generalisable across Indonesia or beyond, because
leadership evaluation is always situational. Leaders are
evaluated in a proximate context of their organisation or
sector, as well as in the distal context of a particular cul-
tural and political system (Aviolo, 2007). While the over-
all results are consistent and clear, it is possible to iden-
tify outlier cases where prototypicality does not trump
effectiveness—future work can and should seek to test
the relative importance of different dimensions of iden-
tity, for example through focus groups and or leverag-
ing conjoint experimental techniques. The findings here
would also be strengthened by testing for clientelism and
patronage, testing for a more diverse set of leadership
behaviours or outcomes than simply success or failure,
by using field or natural experiments to test real world
voting or electoral behaviour (not just survey outcomes).
From a development perspective, this study suggests
there is further value in testing the prototypicality effect
across diverse settings. The pattern across much of the
world—developed and developing—is that leaders are
often not responsive to followers’ interests, and do not
work towards inclusive development, nor deliver on elec-
tion promises. These leaders are, however, not always
unpopular. Prototypical leaders may have considerably
more room for manoeuvre in the sense that they can
fail but still be perceived as trustworthy. On the other
hand, non-prototypical leaders may have to work hard-
er to gain trust through effective performance or appeal-
ing to sub-groups in the population that are more likely
to weigh effectiveness against identity. Finally, for those
wishing to support leadership, whether domestically or
from the outside, the results underline the importance
of thinking politically about the significance of identity,
not just thinking technically about effective leadership.
Leadership development training and support can help
leaders think about how they present or narrate their
connection with their followers—without this, effective
leadership may not be enough.
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